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APPELLATE BODY INTERPRETATION OF THE
WTO AGREEMENT: A CRITIQUE IN LIGHT OF
JAPAN-TAXES ONALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
Ram6n R. Gupta
Abstract: In Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body of the
WTO upheld the conclusions of a Panel report finding Japan's Liquor Tax Law in
violation of Article Ill of the GATT 1994. Considering that Japan has agreed to comply
with the ruling, the Appellate Body seems to have successfully dealt with the issue. Yet
analysis of the case brings to question the Appellate Body's interpretations of law.
Though the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO resulted from recognition of a
need for predictability and security in international trade law, the Appellate Body's
interpretations fail to provide such law. As this inadequacy is likely to continue, the
Body's interpretative powers should be restricted. In compliance with a strict
construction of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, interpretations should be made by
the more political and representative entities of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 25, 1996, the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO")' reported its decision in the Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages ("Japan Tax") case.2 The decision upheld a WTO
Panel report which had found Japan's Liquor Tax Law3 in violation of the
Internal Taxation and Regulation provisions of Article III of the GATT
1994. 4 In accordance with WTO procedures,5 the decision was adopted by
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO in November, 1996.6 By late
The World Trade Organization was established on April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], and came into effect on January 1, 1995. E.g. Friedl Weiss, WTO Dispute Settlement and the
Economic Order of WTO Member States, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 77,
77 (Pitou Van Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996).
2 See Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan v. U.S., Can., Eur. Communities),
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSI0/AB/R, WT/DSI1I/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (WTO Appellate Body) available in
1996 WL 738800 [hereinafter Japan Tax Appellate], aff'g WT/DS8/R, WT/DSI01R, WT/DSI I/R (July 11,
1996) available in 1996 WL 406720 (WTO Dispute Settlement Panel) [hereinafter Japan Tax Panel].
3 Shuzeiho, (Liquor Tax Law), Law No. 6 of 1953 as amended.
' See Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § I.
5 WTO Agreement art. 3:3.
6 WTO Proposes Japan Close Liquor Tax Gap by Next Feb. 1, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Feb. 17,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8244833.
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December of that year, Japan had agreed to remedy the situation by bringing
the Liquor Tax Law into compliance with the WTO decision.7
This chain of events marked the second completed case of the WTO
dispute settlement procedure.8 As with the first case, a complaint against
the United States,9 not only was a major international economic power
found in violation of the WTO Agreement, but in addition that nation
declared its intention to comply with the Organization's decision.'
Such results were more difficult under the dispute resolution
procedures of the GATT 1947.1' Under those procedures, dispute resolution
emphasized diplomacy, flexibility, and equity.' 2 In contrast, the new WTO
procedure, titled the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"),1
3
emphasizes legal dispute resolution. 14 Now, under the DSU, after attempts
at consultations fail, parties are essentially guaranteed a panel hearing' 5 and
an opportunity for appeal.' 6
Considering the outcome of the cases and the heavy usage of the
organization, 17  it seems, as WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero
7 See Japan Set to Comply with WTO Ruling, Will Revise Domestic Liquor Taxes, J. COM., Dec. 18,
1996, at A4 [hereinafter Japan to Comply].
' See Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (last modified Apr. 1, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm> [hereinafter Overview of Disputes]. The first case was
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (U.S. v. Braz., Venez.), 35 I.L.M.
603 (1996) (WTO Appellate Body) [hereinafter U.S. Gasoline Appellate], aFfg 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996)
(WTO Dispute Settlement Panel) [hereinafter U.S. Gasoline Panel]. Since Japan Tax, two more cases have
been completed: United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear (Costa
Rica v. U.S.), WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997) (WTO Appellate Body) [hereinafter U.S. Cotton
Underwear], and Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Phil. v. Brazil), WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb.
21, 1997) (WTO Appellate Body) [hereinafter Brazil Coconut].
' See, e.g., U.S. Gasoline Appellate, supra note 8.
'o US. Agrees to Abide by Gas Import Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1996, at D4.
" Under GATT 1947 a losing party could block adoption of a panel report by not consenting to the
report. See Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round- Lawyers Triumph over
Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 402 (1995). Even where a report was adopted, nations felt no obligation to
comply with the decision. See, e.g., Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral
Retaliations Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233, 258
(1996).
2 Young, supra note 11, at 389-91.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1994,




t See ld. para. 16:4.
'7 Since its entry into force a little over two years ago, seventy-four cases have been filed with the
WTO. Overview of Disputes, supra note 8. In comparison, only 196 cases were handled by GATT 1947
over nearly half a century. Francis Williams, News: World Trade: Antagonists Queue for WTO Judgment:
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recognized, "the system is working very well."'" Yet despite its apparent
success, analysis of Japan Tax brings into question the Appellate Body's
interpretations of law. Though these interpretations brought an end to the
dispute,' 9 they are inadequate in light of the purposes of the WTO. As this
comment will discuss, interpretations of the WTO Agreement must further
the predictability and clarity of international trade law.20
In the Japan Tax case, the main issue is whether Japan's Liquor Tax
law discriminates against "like domestic" or "directly competitive or
substitutable" products.2  While defining these terms provides an
opportunity to clarify international trade law, the Appelate Body shies
away from the challenge. Clear definitions of the terms are not provided,
and as a result, future application of the WTO Agreement is left
unpredictable.
This situation of poor interpretation of law is likely to continue.
Because the Appellate Body already creates controversy each time it
decides against a Member nation's laws, it is unlikely that the Appellate
Body will strive to create more controversy through clear interpretations.
Telling a sovereign nation that they must change their laws challenges the
continuing membership of that nation in the WTO. Establishing clear
definitions of "directly competitive or substitutable products" could
challenge every membership to the WTO.
In hopes of preventing further inadequate interpretations of law, this
comment calls for the development of a procedure to bring interpretation
issues to the Ministerial Conference and General Council of the WTO. As
these entities consist of a representative of each Member of the WTO, and
essentially act as legislative bodies, it is likely their interpretations will
provide more predictability to international trade law.
Such a procedure is in accordance with Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement. Article IX:2 provides that the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council have exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the
Agreement.22 A strict construction of this provision dictates that final
Frances [sic] Williams on a Vote of Confidence in the Trade Body's Capacity to Settle Disputes, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at 6, available in 1996 WL 10606203.
" See Anne Swardson, Trial for the Trade Police; The WTO Has a Lot to Lose When It Hears a
ComplaintAbout the US., WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1996, at C 11.
" Japan to Comply, supra note 7.
See DSU para. 3.2.
See generally Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2.
2 See WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
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determinations as to questions of law should be made by these entities
rather than the Appellate Body.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of International Trade Dispute Resolution Procedures
To understand the WTO and its purposes, a brief introduction to its
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 ("GATT
1947",),24 is necessary. The GATT 1947 was drafted in the mid-1940s 25 as a
multilateral treaty with the purpose of imposing on nations the obligation to
refrain from using various trade impeding measures.26 Although for years
the GATT has been generally recognized as the principal international
organization and rule system governing most of the world's trade, the 1947
Agreement was not originally intended to create an international
organization. 27  Rather, the GATT was designed to operate under the
"umbrella" of a comprehensive legal entity, the International Trade
Organization ("ITO").2s
Because the ITO never came into effect,29 nations were left to work
with the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT 1947.30  These
23 See ASIF H. QURESHI, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE NORMS 99-100 (1996).
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
25 See, e.g., PAR HALLSTROM, THE GATT PANELS AND THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 23-24 (1994).
26 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS 33
(1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].
27 See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 1 (1990) [hereinafter JACKSON,
RESTRUCTURING].
28 HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78
91948), reprinted in U.N. Doe. ICITO/l/4 (1948). See also JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 26, at 33. The charter of the ITO "envisaged procedures extending from consultation and
arbitration to recourse to the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions on legal questions arising
within the scope of the activities of the Organization' (Article 96, paragraph I)." OLIVER LONG, LAW AND
ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATr MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 1 (1985).
29 Though a charter establishing the ITO was completed pursuant to the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment held in Havana, Cuba from November 21, 1947, to March 24, 1948, the charter
did not attain necessary recognition. LONG, supra note 28, at 1. Waning support in the U.S. Congress
resulted in the Charter never coming to the floor of Congress. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the
Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 3 (1995).
While technically the ITO could have been put in place without the United States, no nation desired to
enter an ITO which did not include the post-World War 11's strongest economic power. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 34.
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procedures emphasized diplomacy, flexibility, and an equitable approach to
dispute resolution.3 As many nations preferred this political approach to
resolving disputes, few modifications were made to enhance the rule of law
in the process.3" It was not until the Uruguay Round of negotiations,
launched in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, that steps were made towards
a more rule-oriented system of dispute resolution.33
B. The Shift from Diplomatic to Legalistic
In developing a mechanism for international dispute settlement, the
issue of debate has been whether the mechanism should be diplomatic 14 or
legalistic in its approach.3 Since the GATT's application in 1948 until the
establishment of the WTO, the diplomatic view has controlled.3 6  The
dispute resolution process has primarily aimed to avoid conflict and reach
mutually satisfactory conclusions. 17
This diplomatic approach is visible in the dispute resolution
provisions of articles XX1 38 and XXIII of the GATT. 39 "Article XXII
30 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization:
Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L LAW. 1095, 1096 (1995) (U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24,
1995). The GATT had been put into force prior to the United States Congress' consideration of the ITO
thanks to the adoption of the Protocol of Provisional Application. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 35 (citing 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947)). Pursuant to the Protocol, U.S. negotiators
had until mid-1948 to accept an agreement without further submission to Congress. Thus, there was strong
motivation to bring the GATT, the writing of which was completed in October 1947, into force before a
charter establishing ITO could be completed. Id. at 34-35.
3" Young, supra note 11, at 389-91. There are 19 clauses in GATT 1947 which deal with the
resolution of disputes. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 164 (1969)
[hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT].
32 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 30, at 1098.
3' To begin the development of a more legalistic dispute resolution process, the Contracting Parties
adopted the "Improvements of 1989." See Miquel MontalA i Mora, A GA 7T with Teeth: Law Wins Over
Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 136-41
(1993).
34 Nations advocating for a diplomatic approach highlighted the ambiguity of GATT rules, the
political sensitivity of trade disputes, and the complex tradeoffs of competing interests that go into the
formulation of any trade rule. Young, supra note 11, at 390. See also MontaflA i Mora, supra note 33, at
128-36.
3 Advocates for the legalistic approach "argue that the necessity for certainty and predictability in
the management of international business transactions calls for a more rule-oriented system." MontafA i
Mora, supra note 33, at 129.
" See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 11, at 255, 259-63. The diplomatic model is also known as the
pragmatic model. Id. at 256-57.
37 The GATT 1947 produced a dispute resolution process primarily "aimed at lowering tensions,
defusing conflicts and promoting compromise." Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights:
Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477,479 (1994).
3" GATT 1947 art. XXII.
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contains a very broad two-tier consultation clause providing for bilateral
consultations in the first instance and multilateral consultations if the former
fails., 40 Article XXIII provides the unhappy complainant with the right to
take the matter to the contracting parties who could be required to promptly
investigate and make appropriate recommendations or give a ruling.4 '
Under serious circumstances, this ruling might "include the suspension of
concessions or other GATT obligations by the aggrieved party against the
offending party. 42
While this process appears sensible, and for a time seemed effective,
significant procedural deficiencies materialized. 3 The composition of
adjudicative panels became a point of disagreement. 44 Parties found ways
to delay decisions; 45 even if decisions were made, it became difficult to
secure adoption of the panel reports.46 In fact, panel reports frequently
remained unadopted for years because one or more nations disagreed with
the panel's rulings or recommendations.47 Where reports were adopted,
nations felt no obligation to comply with the decisions.48
In the 1980s, frustrated with the GATT dispute resolution system, a
growing trade deficit, and closed foreign markets, the United States turned
to unilateral action through the use of section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974.49 Section 301 ultimately, after a number of steps are taken,5 ° gives
the President authority to retaliate against foreign protectionist practices by
various unilateral measures, including trade sanctions.5 While the section
301 process provides for filing GATT complaints, there is no requirement
I ld. art. XXIII. These GATT dispute resolution provision "fell pretty much on the non-legalistic
side of the line." Young, supra note I1, at 391.
40 Montaf1 i Mora, supra note 33, at 117.
4' Young, supra note 11, at 392.
42 Id.
43 See Silverman, supra note 11, at 258-59.
" Id at 258.
45 Id.
46 Young, supra note 11, at 402.
47 Id.
41 Silverman, supra note 11, at 258.
41 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a) (1996)); See G. Richard Shell,
Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of The World Trade Organization, 44
DUKE L.J. 829, 843-45 (1995).
'o See 19 U.S.C. §2411(a)(1996).
5' The U.S. Trade Representative determines if a sanction is appropriate and what the sanction
should be, but the President has the final say as to whether to impose the sanction. § 241 1(a)(1).
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that the U.S. wait for the GATT proceedings to be resolved before taking
unilateral actions. 2
To say the least, many U.S. trade partners were not pleased with the
United State's unilateral actions.5 3 A general desire developed to replace
these unilateral threats with a stable dispute resolution system. 4 In
addition, the major GATT players began to realize that a more legalistic
system could be used to advance their own trade interests as well as curb the
use of section 301.5' Also, developing nations thought a stronger dispute
settlement system would give them additional leverage in negotiating with
wealthier states over protectionist laws that limit their ability to export to
these states.56
As a result of this change in outlook, and with the support of the
United States,57 the groundwork was set for the then-underway Uruguay
Round to create a rule-oriented dispute settlement procedure. 58 In the end,
the desire for a system which would be more transparent, consistent, and
predictable59 led to the metamorphosis of the GATT into the World Trade
Organization.6"
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. Organizational Structure and Purposes
The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement ("the WTO Agreement" or "the
Agreement"), 6 culminating the Uruguay Round,62 established the World
" Shell, supra note 49, at 844. For a brief, but comprehensive, discussion of section 301, refer to
Silverman, supra note 11, at 240-52.
" Shell, supra note 49, at 845 (citing Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory Action in United States and
European Union Trade Law: A Comparison of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council
Regulation 2641/84, 20 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 41, 44-45 (1994)).
14 Id. See also Bello & Holmer, supra note 30, at 1101-02.
's Shell, supra note 49 at 847.
56 David M. Trubek, Protectionism and Development: Time for a New Dialogue?, 25 N.Y. U. J.
INT'L L & POL. 345, 364-65 (1993).
" The United States has historically favored a more legalistic approach. See MontafIl i Mora, supra
note 33, at 129-31; Philip A. Akakwan, The Standard of Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code:
Circumscribing the Role of GA 7T Panels in Reviewing National Antidumping Determinations, 5 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 277, 285 (1996).
s Shell, supra note 49, at 846-48.
" Akakwam, supra note 57, at 285.
6o QURESHI, supra note 23, at 3.
61 WTO Agreement. The WTO Agreement was signed in Marrakesh (also spelled as Marrakech)
Morocco on April 15, 1994. See Philip Raworth, Introduction, in THE LAW OF THE WTO 1995, at 15
(1995) (Practioner's Deskbook Series).
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Trade Organization to ensure the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade, and to eliminate the discriminatory treatment in international
relations.63  Unlike the GATT 1947, the WTO is not a treaty signed by
Contracting parties, but rather an organization' 4 with the 130 signatory
nations65 defined as Members.
66
Pursuant to attaining its goals of reducing barriers to trade and
discriminatory treatment, the WTO functions in four ways. First, it
provides a substantive code of conduct.67 This code of conduct incorporates
the GATT 1947-the WTO refers to the articles of the GATT 1947 as
articles of the GATT 1994-and the additional agreements of the Uruguay
Round of negotiations. 61
Second, it provides the institutional framework for the administration
of the various agreements.69 This framework is structured with the highest
organ as the "Ministerial Conference." This body, which is to meet at least
once every two years,70 is made up of representatives of all the Members,7 1
generally Ministers of Trade,72 and has supreme authority over all matters.73
Below the Ministerial Conference is the General Council. 74 This body is
also made up of representatives of all Members, 75 generally trade delegates
based in Geneva, Switzerland, at the WTO headquarters.76 The General
62 See Tracy M. Abels, Comment, The World Trade Organization's First Test: The United States-
Japan Auto Dispute, 44 UCLA L. REv. 467, 468 (1996).
63 WTO Agreement preamble.
64See id. art. l.
65 WTO Membership (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/memtab2_wpfhtml>. An
additional twenty-nine nations have requested to join the WTO including the Russian Federation, the
People's Republic of China, Cambodia, Tonga, and Vietnam. Id
6 Compare GATT 1947 with WTO Agreement.
67 QURESHI, supra note 23, at 5.
6 WTO Agreement arts. 11:2-3. The WTO Agreement has four Annexes, as referred to in arts. 11:2-
3. Annex IA contains the multilateral agreements on trade in goods, which includes the so-called GATT
1994. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
WTO, Annex IA, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. It is important to note that GATT
1994 has five components, one of which is the original text of GATT 1947. See Raworth, supra note 61, at
15-17. Annexes I B, IC, 2 and 3 are the other multilateral agreements. Annex 4 includes the Plurilateral
Agreements. See id.
WTO Agreement art. 11:1.
'0 Id. art. IV:I1.
"' "[Iln the WTO, unlike the IMF or the World Bank, there is no weighted voting." QUREsHI, supra
note 23, at 6. See WTO Agreement art. IX:1.
72 QURESHI, supra note 23, at 6.
73 WTO Agreement art. IV: I.
7 Id. art. IV:2.
75 Id.
76 QURESHI, supra note 23, at 6.
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Council meets between the meetings of the Ministerial Conference, has all
the powers of the Ministerial Conference while it is not in session, and
essentially acts as the engine of the WTO.77 Other councils with specific
spheres of responsibility, Committees on different issues, 7 and a Secretariat
headed by a Director General, also make up the structure of the WTO.79
Third, the WTO functions as a medium for the conduct of
international trade relations among member states."0 Fourth, and of
particular interest in this paper, the WTO ensures implementation of these
agreements by providing a forum for dispute settlement of international
trade matters.8' In essence, this fourth function creates with the WTO what
the Havana Charter had attempted to create with the ITO: an institution to
adjudicate international trade disputes.
B. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
1. Overview of the DSU
The newly-created dispute settlement procedure, titled Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("Dispute
Settlement Understanding" or "DSU"),"2 marks a profound change from the
GATT 1947 procedures.8 3 In a shift from the diplomatic approach of the
GATT, the WTO realizes the international trend toward legal dispute
settlement.8 4  Instead of pursuing goals of compromise and negotiated
settlement, the DSU strives to provide security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system. 5
In contrast to previous GATT procedures, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding provides a single dispute resolution mechanism for most
17 WTO Agreement art. IV:2; See also QURESHI, supra note 23, at 6.
71 WTO Agreement arts. IV:5-7.
71 Id. art. Vl.
'o Id. art. 111:2.
11 Id art. 111:3.
2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
93 Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 555, 580 (1996).
4 See, e.g, Young, supra note 11, at 399, 405-06.
" See DSU para. 3.2.
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trade disputes8 6 between nations. 87 This mechanism is administered by the
Ministerial Conference, or if it is not in session then the General Council,
acting as the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").88 Thus, the composition of
this body mirrors the WTO Membership.89
Pursuant to the DSU, conflicts may be resolved through "consultation
procedures, good offices, conciliation and mediation, arbitration,
adjudication by a panel, and an appeal structure." 90  The use of these
techniques emphasizes a balance between ensuring consensual resolution
between members and the prominence of the rule of law.9'
For this comment, the panel and appellate procedures are of most
interest because these adjudicative procedures 92 particularly distinguish
WTO dispute resolution from that of the GATT 1947."3 To initiate these
procedures, a complaining party must first comply with the strict
consultation requirements of the DSU. 9 4 If consultations fail, the allegedly




Once an appropriate request for a panel has been made, the
establishment of a three person96  panel is essentially certain97  and
Compare JACKSON, WORLD TRtADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3 1, at 164-66 (discussing
the nineteen different dispute resolution mechanisms) with DSU para. 1.1. Though not pertinent to this
comment, the mechanism of the DSU is not all encompassing. See QURESHI, supra note 23, at 98. Special
dispute settlement provisions contained in specific GATT agreements still must be followed. See id.
87 Private parties cannot bring complaints to the WTO, but must request their respective
govemments to instigate complaints. QuRESHi, supra note 23, at 98-99.
U WTO Agreement art. IV:3; DSU para. 2.1.
'9 Reitz, supra note 83, at 584-85.
9o QURESHI, supra note 23, at 100; see DSU.
9' QURESHI, supra note 23, at 100.
The dispute settlement procedure is now divided into extrajudicial and judicial, or adjudicatory,
stages. See Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing Their Sovereign Rights? The
GATT Dispute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 172-86
(1996). Consultations, good offices, and mediations encompass the extrajudicial. Panel and appeal
processes characterize the judicial. See id
" See Young supra note 11, at 405-06.
'4 DSU paras. 4.1-4.11.
95 Id. paras. 6.1-6.2.
96 Id. para. 8.5. The Secretariat proposes nominations for the panel. "[Plarties to the dispute shall
not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons." Id. para. 8.6.
9' See id para. 6.1. In theory the DSB can decline a country's request for a panel if all DSB
members agree by consensus not to establish a panel. As the requesting party is unlikely to join such a
consensus, the DSB essentially must always establish a panel. Young, supra note 1I, at 402.
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automatic." Panelists are to serve as individuals and not as representatives
of their nations. 99 They are to be governmental or non-governmental
individuals who have served in a representative capacity in the WTO system
or its Secretariat, have taught or published on international trade law, or
have served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.'00
Panels are to meet in closed session, to keep confidential all materials
received and meetings held, I0  to provide an interim report to the parties for
consideration, 0 2 and to provide a final report generally within six months of
the panel's establishment. 3 Once a final report is issued by a panel, it is
adopted by the DSB unless either there is a negative consensus-it is
decided by a consensus of the DSB not to adopt the report-or one of the
parties formally notifies the DSB of an intention to appeal.'0 4 The right of
appeal from a panel report exists only on a point of law covered in the panel
report and on legal interpretation developed by the panel. 10 5 All appeals are
made to the Appellate Body.
10 6
3. Appellate Review
The Appellate Body is made up of a standing group of seven
individuals who are "of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise
in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements
generally."'0 7 They are appointed by the DSB for four year terms and may
be reinstated once.
0 8
98 See Young, supra note 11, at 402. The DSU requires: that a list of possible panel members be
kept on file, that a panel be formed within a short number of days, and that the terms of reference be
determined within twenty days. See DSU paras. 8.1-8.11.
99 DSU para. 8.9. Citizens of Member nations whose governments are in dispute are not to serve
on a panel concerned with that dispute unless the parties agree. Id. para. 8.3.
100 Id. para. 8. 1.
101 Id. paras. 14.1-14.3; see also id. app. 3, cl. 2.
102 Id. paras. 15.1-15.3.
103 Id. para. 12.8.
104 Id. para. 16.4.
105 Id. para. 17.6.
106 Id. para. 17. 1.
107 Id. para. 17.3. The individuals should not be affiliated with any government. As a group they
should reflect the membership of the WTO. Id. The present Appellate Body Members are: James
Bacchus, former U.S. Congressman and former Special Assistant to the United States Trade
Representative; Christopher Beeby, trade diplomat and former Ambassador from New Zealand; Laus-
Dieter Ehlermann, German trade lawyer and professor of international economic law; Florentino Feliciano,
Filipino Supreme Court Justice and former trade lawyer; Mitsuo Matsushita, Japanese professor of
international economic law with ties to the Japanese Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International
Trade and Industry; Julio Lacarte Muro, Uruguayan trade diplomat and participant in all eight GATT
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Cases appealed to the Appellate Body are heard by three members of
the Body." 9 Those individuals may uphold, modify, or reverse the legal
findings and conclusions of law made by a panel."' As with the panels,
proceedings are confidential and opinions must be given anonymously."'
Proceedings should generally take no longer than 60 days." 2 In accord with
panel report adoption, an Appellate Body report shall be adopted unless
there is a "negative consensus."'" 13
4. Use of the DSU
At the time of this writing, four cases have been completed under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, and sixteen have been settled or have
become inactive." 4  The four completed cases, United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 115 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages,"6 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-
made Fibre Underwear,117 and Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated
Coconut,18 were decided by the Appellate Body and adopted by the DSB." 9
Since the adoption of the decisions, the nations involved have complied
with, or agreed to comply with, the decisions. 20
negotiation rounds; and Said el-Naggar, Egyptian professor of economics. See Daily Report for
Executives, Biographical Notes on Members of the World Trade Organization Appeals Body Released Nov.
29 in Geneva by the WTO, Nov. 30, 1995 (BNA) No. 230, at M-l (1995).
log Id. para. 17.2.
109 Id. para. 17.1. The three members are to be selected on the basis of rotation, "taking into
account the principles of random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to serve
regardless of their national origin." Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Feb. 15, 1996, rule 6(2),
35 I.L.M. 495, 505 (1996).
110 DSU para. 17.13.
H Id paras. 17.10-17.11. Dissenting opinions are not specifically forbidden, but their expression
would likely run afoul of the requirement of anonymity. See Reitz, supra note 83, at 584 n.137.
112 DSU para. 17.5. At most the proceeding may take 90 days. Id.
13 See id.,paras. 16.4, 17.14.
14 See Overview of Disputes, supra note 8.
"5 U.S. Gasoline Appellate supra note 8.
116 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2.
17 U.S. Cotton Underwear, supra note 8.
Hs Brazil Coconut, supra note 8.
19 See Overview of Disputes, supra note 8.
12o See US. to Comply with WTO Ruling on Gasoline Imports, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1996, at A20;
Japan to Comply, supra note 7. See generally US. Disappointed About WTO Ruling on Cost Rica
Underwear, Dow Jones Int'l News Service, Feb. 10, 1997, available in WESTLAW, USNEWS database.
See Cecilia E Yap, Gov't Urged to Pursue Coco Case in Brazil, BUSINESSWORLD (MANILA), Apr. 3, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 10161604.
APPELLATE INTERPRETATION OF THE WTO
There are also thirteen active cases under Panel review, and seventy-
four cases presently in consultation pursuant to paragraph 4 of the DSU.'
2
1
IV. EXPECTATIONS OF THE APPELLATE BODY
A. The Present Expectation
The WTO's dispute settlement procedure has been expected to
function much as a traditional judicial system, with the Appellate Body
having the final say as to issues of law.122 This is a sensible understanding
in light of paragraph 17.6 of the DSU which states, "an appeal shall be
limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel."' 123 The Appellate Body is to hear issues of law and
legal interpretation; with no higher judicial body, logically, this body should
have the final say.
Not surprisingly, the Appellate Body itself has accepted this
understanding of its position as interpreter of law.' 24 This is particularly
apparent in the Japan Tax125 decision where the Appellate Body interpreted
vague terminology in Article III of the GATT 1994,126 and also dealt with
an issue of determining facts.'
2 7
B. The Issue ofArticle IX.2
1. An Alternative Perspective on the Appellate Body
Yet despite the expectations, the logic, and the reality of Appellate
Body actions, it is not entirely clear that this understanding is defensible in
light of other WTO Agreement provisions. While paragraph 17.6 of the
121 See Overview of Disputes, supra note 8.
122 "The initial appointees to the WTO Appellate Body have an especially heavy responsibility to
give that important body and its decisions stature and credibility; their judgments will become the
paramount precedents of the new system." Reitz, supra note 83, at 584; see also Shell, supra note 49, at
897.
123 DSU art. 17.6.
124 "[T]he DSU directs the Appellate Body to clarify the provisions of GATT 1994 and the other
covered agreements' of the WTO Agreement .... Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §D. See also U.S.
Gasoline Appellate, supra note 8, at 17.
125 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2.
126 Id. § H(l)(a).
127 Id § H(2)(a).
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DSU seems to support the perspective taken by the Body,'2 8 Article IX:2 of
the Agreement brings it into question.'29 Article IX:2 states, "[t]he
Ministerial Conference [("MC")] and the General Council [("GC")] shall
have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and
of the Multilateral Trade Agreements . . . . The decision to adopt an
interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members."'' 30
In accordance with this provision, paragraph 3.9 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding states, "[t]he provisions of this Understanding are without
prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of
provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO
Agreement."131
Strictly construing these provisions keeps from the Dispute
Settlement Body, and thus the panels and Appellate Body, the full
interpretative function generally allowed to common law judicial bodies. 3 1
In other words, as discussed by Professor Asif H. Qureshi in his book, The
World Trade Organization: Implementing International Trade Norms, these
provisions de-couple the interpretative function from the judicial forum.133
This is not to say that these provisions entirely deny the DSB, and
thus the Appellate Body, the right to interpret law. Rather, Professor
Qureshi holds, perhaps in light of paragraph 17.6 of the DSU, 34 that these
provisions only deny the DSB the final decision as to any question of
interpretation. 35 Pursuant to Article IX:2, issues of interpretation should be
resolved by the MC or GC.
11
6
This division between the DSB and the GC may seem
inconsequential considering that the GC acts as the DSB. 137  Yet the
distinction to be made is not in who is making decisions, but how. Though
the GC will act as the DSB, while wearing its "General Council" hat,
decisions must be made by a three-fourths majority.' This is a tougher
128 See DSU para. 17.6. See also id. para. 3.2.
129 See WTO Agreement art. IX:2. See also DSU para. 3.9.
130 WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
... DSU para. 3.9.
13 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 2 (1988).
1 QURESHI, supra note 23, at 99.
134 DSU para. 17.6.
135 Id
136 WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
137 Id. art. IV:3.
138 Id. art. IX:2.
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standard than that of the DSB, which, as discussed, makes decisions to
adopt a report by negative consensus.1
39
Considering this negative consensus rule, 40 six individuals-three
individuals on the Panel and three on the Appellate Body'-make
interpretation decisions which affect parties in a particular case.
Furthermore, these interpretations, while not creating legal precedents,'42 do
create legitimate expectations among WTO Members. 4 3  "[L]egal
interpretations developed by GATT panels have been subsequently
incorporated when considering reform of substantive norms . . . . [T]he
decisions of the Appellate Body are likely to be highly considered in the
future."'
144
This result is in direct conflict with Article IX:2's requirement that
the MC or GC make final decisions as to interpretation. "4' De-coupling of
the interpretative function would defeat this six-person interpretation in
support of Article IX:2. Instead of the common law system, where courts
interpret the law and then legislative bodies, frustrated with the court's
interpretation, clarify the statutory code, 46 de-coupling the interpretative
function would cut out the possibility of frustration. The judicial body
would be restricted from making final interpretations; thus, those issues
would go to the MC and the GC, more political and representative bodies. 47
Despite this sensible understanding of Article IX:2, no cases have
involved questions of interpretation going before the General Council or
Ministerial Conference. In fact, as Professor Qureshi discusses, there are no
139 DSU paras. 16.4, 17.14. The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter
submitted for its consideration, if no Member present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken,
formally objects to the proposed decision. Id. para. 2.4 n. 1.
140 Id. paras. 16.4, 17.14.
141 Id. paras. 8.5, 17.1.
142 There is no principle of stare deqisis in international law. See John H. Jackson, Strengthening
the International Legal Framework of the GATT-MTN System: Reform Proposals for the New GATT
Round, in 5 THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS 3, 13 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988) [hereinafter Jackson, Reform
Proposals].
143 See Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § E.
144 MontaflI i Mora, supra note 33, at 162-63.
'45 WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
14 See HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 342 (2nd ed. 1988).
147 See QURESHI, supra note 23, at 99-100. See also WTO Agreement art. IV. Neither Professor
Qureshi's book nor this comment argue that these interpretations should undermine the amendment
provisions of Article X. Rather de-coupling should ensure decisions as to interpretation are made by the
general membership. See QURESHI, supra note 23, at 8, 100.
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provisions describing how this would be done, nor time limits mandating
how long the General Council might take to make a decision. 4
2. The Appellate Body's Understanding ofArticle IX2
In the absence of a system of implementation, it is not surprising that
the Appellate Body has interpreted Article IX:2 differently than Professor
Qureshi. 14 9 In Japan Tax, along with interpreting Article III of the GATT
1994,15° the Appellate Body discussed Article IX:2 of the Agreement and
paragraph 3.9 of the DSU. 15 '
The Body considered these provisions as pertaining to the status of
adopted panel reports.' 2 Disagreeing with the Panel decision to give the
reports status as "subsequent practice,"'5 3 and thus significant precedential
weight,1 4 the Appellate Body held that the reports are binding only
"with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that
dispute."' 5
On its face, this analysis of Article IX:2 of the Agreement and
paragraph 3.9 of the DSU seems to significantly restrict the panels and the
Appellate Body from developing binding interpretations of the agreements
through the power of precedent. Yet despite the Appellate Body's
discouragement of reliance on previous decisions, the Body's report, at the
same time, actually advocates for their importance.'56 As stated, "adopted
panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often
considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations
among WTO Members, and therefore, should be taken into account where
they are relevant to any dispute.""' In addition, the Body cited to the
practices of the International Court of Justice, stating that though decisions
143 QURESHI, supra note 23, at 99.
149 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § E.
[so Id. §§ F-H.
15 Id. § E.
152 Id§ E.
153 Id. (citing Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 6. 10).
154 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), 8 I.L.M. 679.
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention constitutes generally accepted rules of
international agreement interpretation. See id.
155 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § E. Though the Appellate Body discusses adopted panel
reports, its conclusions can be extended to adopted appellate reports as the process of adoption of a panel
report is the same as an appellate body report. Compare DSU paras. 16.1-16.4 with para. 17.14.
156 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § E.
157 Id.
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of that court are only binding on the parties to the case, "this has not
inhibited the development by that Court... of a body of case law in which
considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is discernible." '58
The Body's advocacy for adopted reports ignores Article IX:2's full
strength. I5 9 Article IX:2 mandates that the Ministerial. Conference and the
General Council shall have exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of
the trade agreements. 60  There is no reason interpretations by any other
entity should carry any significant weight. Allowing these decisions to
create legitimate expectations for Members, 16 1 and gesturing that these
decisions might develop into reliable case law, 16 is going further than a
clear reading of the provisions would allow.
63
In addition, the Body's holding that panel or Appellate Body
interpretations "are not binding, except with respect to resolving the
particular dispute between the parties,"' 64 disregards Members' rights
provided by paragraph 3.9. "The provisions of this Understanding are
without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative
interpretation of provisions ... 165 There is no indication from the DSU
that interpretations as to particular parties should be made differently than
general interpretations. In fact, as paragraph 3.9 of the DSU falls under the
general provisions of the DSU, 16 6 it is logical that its application is
appropriate even in a case between two parties.
67
V. INTERPRETATION OF THE WTO AGREEMENT
A. Guidelines for Interpretation: The Vienna Convention
In Japan Tax, the Appellate Body refers to paragraph 3.2 of the
DSU 61 stating, "[it] directs the Appellate Body to clarify the provisions of
GATT 1994 and the other 'covered agreements' of the WTO Agreement 'in
158 Id. § E n.30.
19 See WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
160 Id. art. IX:2. See also DSU para. 3.9.
161 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, at 15.
162 Id. § E, n.30.
163 See WTO Agreement art. IX:2; DSU para. 3.9.
164 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § E.
165 DSU para. 3.9.
166 See DSU para. 3.1-3.12.
167 In fact the Vienna Convention stresses that terms of a treaty should be interpreted in their
context. Here the context is all of Article 3. See Vienna Convention art. 31, para. 1.
168 DSU para 3.2.
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accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law.""' 169 In light of these customary rules of interpretation, the Body looks
to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 170 Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, entitled the "general rule of interpretation," has attained the
status of a rule of customary or general international law. It provides the
following maxims of interpretation:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of the terms in light of their context
and its object and purpose.
2. For purposes of interpretation, the context shall include the
preamble and annexes of the agreement.
3. Together with the context, interpretation shall also take into
account: a. any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or application of its
provisions; b. any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
interpretation; c. any relevant rules of international law
applicable between the parties.
4. If it is established that the parties intended a special
meaning for a term, that meaning shall be given. 7 '
Article 32, entitled "supplementary means of interpretation" is
considered by the Body as highly pertinent to the present appeal. 172 This
Article provides that supplementary means of interpretation, such as the
preparatory work of the treaty and circumstances of its conclusion, may be
used to confirm the meaning of a provision resulting from the application of
Article 31.173 These means of interpretation may also be used, where in
spite of Article 31, the meaning is ambiguous, obscure, or leads to an
unreasonable or absurd result.
17 4
169 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § D (emphasis in original).
170 Id. § D. See Vienna Convention art. 31-32.
171 Vienna Convention art. 31.
72 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, § D.
173 Vienna Convention art. 32.
174 Id
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B. The Importance of Furthering Predictability and Clarity
In light of the demands of the Vienna Convention to look to the
context of a provision and the circumstances of a treaty's conclusion, 175 it is
clear that adequate interpretations of the WTO Agreement must include
creating more predictable rules. As discussed, the WTO originated in
response to frustration with the inadequate, highly diplomatic dispute
resolution system of the GATT 1947.176 The Contracting parties had come
to recognize, as stated by Professor John H. Jackson, that the ambiguity of
many of the GATT 1947 rules had polluted the general rule system, and
brought "GATT [1947] rules generally and its dispute settlement procedures
in particular into disrepute."' 177 Much of the world desired a more legal-
oriented system which would be transparent, consistent, and predictable.
17
This desire is stated in paragraph 3.2 of the DSU:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element
in providing security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.
179
In accordance with paragraph 3.2, legal scholars have considered
clarity and the furtherance of predictability as necessary for the proper
functioning of the WTO Agreement.'l 0 As one scholar stated, "the
175 Id. arts. 31-32.
176 See Silverman, supra note I1, at 258-59. "Hitherto, adaptability not legal consistency,
predictability, and certainty were the goals to be achieved." Weiss, supra note 1, at 83.
177 Jackson, Reform Proposals, supra note 142, at 16. See also PIETER VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,
Strengthening the International Legal Framework of the GATT- MTN System: A Comment, in 5 THE NEW
GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 25,27 (Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988).
17 Akakwam, supra note 57, at 285.
179 DSU para. 3.2 (emphasis added).
ISO See, e.g., Shell, supra note 49, at 897. This is in accordance with the view that the success of
international law depends upon the predictability of that law. See Jonathan I. Charney, Book Note, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 458, 459-60 (1995) (citing HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 120
(Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (1968)) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSi, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DECISION MAKING (1993)). "Law is valuable only if it
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Appellate Body should expound on the meaning of the agreements within
its jurisdiction and create a corpus of decisions that will assure consistency
in GATT law... ."181
Thus if interpretations of the Agreement provide these elements, the
present system is not in need of change. The fact that the WTO Agreement
may actually disallow the Appellate Body from making interpretations
182
could be ignored. The maxim "don't fix it if it isn't broken" would apply,
and the Appellate Body's understanding of Article IX:2 would be
appropriate."'
Yet Japan Tax evidences that the Appellate Body has inadequately
performed the interpretative function. Instead of providing predictability
and clarity, the Body has made broad and vague interpretations of the WTO
Agreement.
VI. INADEQUATE INTERPRETATIONS: Japan-Tax on Alcoholic Beverages
A. Overview of the Case
The Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case'84 involves a dispute
between Japan, on the one hand, and the European Community ("the
Community"), Canada, and the United States, on the other.'85 The dispute
came as a reaction to the Japanese Liquor Tax Law ("Liquor Tax Law"), 186
which taxes liquors intended for consumption in Japan based on the
beverages categorization within one of ten categories and additional sub-
categories.' 87 In the summer of 1995, the Community, Canada, and the
United States began consultations with Japan. 88 These parties alleged that
the Liquor Tax Law's differentiation between sh6chf--a native spirit
guides the behavior of its subjects in the real world-a task that is particularly delicate in public
international law. If the law is so flexible that any result is possible, it fails to fulfill that essential
function." Id.
"' Reitz, supra note 83, at 584.
22 See WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
183 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §E.
18 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2; Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2.
195 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, paras. 1.1-1.11.
19 Shuzeiho, (Liquor Tax Law), Law No. 6 of 1953 as amended.
1s7 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, paras. 2.1-2.4. The categories and sub-categories are: sake,
sake compound, shfchfi (group A, group B), mirin, beer, wine (wine, sweet wine), whisky/brandy, spirits,
liqueurs, miscellaneous (various sub-categories). Id para. 2.2.
19s Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, paras. 1.1-1.4. Consultations were brought pursuant to
paragraph 4 of the DSU. DSU paras. 4.1-4.11.
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distilled from potatoes, buckwheat or other grains- 189 and vodka, rum, gin,
other "white spirits," whiskey/brandy, other "brown spirits," and liqueurs is
inconsistent with Japan's obligations under the Internal Taxation and
Regulation provisions, Article III of the GATT 1994.'90
The relevant parts of the Article read as follows:
Article III
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes
and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation or use of products. . . should not be
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.191
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly
or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other
internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 10192
18s9 Jon Choy, Tokyo to Appeal WTO Decision on Liquor Taxes, JAPAN ECON. INST. REP., Aug. 23,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8316098. See also 7 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN 1 (1983).
19 GATT 1994. In 1986, the European Communities brought a similar complaint against Japan.
See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report: Japan-Custom Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on
Imported Wines & Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83 (1987)
[hereinafter Japan Tax 1987]. In that complaint, a GATT Panel Report found that some aspects of Japan's
Liquor Tax law were inconsistent with Article III of GATT 1947. Id., at 112-27, paras. 5.1-5.17. The
Recommendations were adopted by the GATT Council, and Japan made some changes to the law in 1989.
See Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 2.8. Despite the changes, the Community began consultations in
1995 "with the belief that the recommendations of the Panel Report had not been fully implemented. See id,
para. 4.5.
Article III of GATT 1947 has been incorporated into GATT 1994. See Raworth, supra note 61,
at 16 for a discussion of the components of GATT 1994. Thus, Article Ill at issue in the Japan Tax case
being discussed in this paper is the same as that dealt with in the 1987 Panel Report. Id.
91 GATT 1994 art. 111:1.
19 Id. art. 111:2 (emphasis added).
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Ad Article III
Paragraph 2
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first
sentence of paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent
with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where
competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed
product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or
substitutable product which was not similarly taxed. 19 3
Essentially, the Parties claimed that as sh6chi and the other alcoholic
beverages are "like products"'94  and/or "directly competitive and
substitutable,"' 19 5 they must be taxed similarly in accordance with the GATT
1994.196
Under the Liquor Tax Law, sh6chfi was taxed at a lower tax rate than
the other spirits. 97 In fact, the tax rate on one-percent alcohol content per
liter of whisky was found to be about six times higher than on sh6chi. 98
European Union figures show that foreign spirits hold only eight percent of
the Japanese market, compared with an average share of between 30 and 50
percent in most other industrialized countries. 99 The parties believed that
this lack of Japanese market penetration was a direct result of the Liquor
Tax Law.2 °°
As consultations between the four parties led to no mutually
acceptable resolution, 2 0 1in late September of 1995, the DSB established a
193 Id. ad art. 111:2 (emphasis added).
'94 Id. art. 111:2, first sentence.
195 Id art. 111:2, second sentence, amended by ad art. 111:2.
19 See Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 3.1-3.4.197 Id. para. 3. 1.
19" Japan/Local Liquor Demand-2: Partners Seek Faster Action, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 16, 1996, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS database. According to the Japan Economic
Institute of America, under the Liquor Tax Law, taxes on sh6chO are 6.8 to 10.4 times higher than those of
vodka, whisky, and other liquors. Choy, supra note 189.
199 E.U/Japan's Liquor Tax-2: Foreign Liquor 8% of Japan Mkt., Dow JONES ASIAN EQ. REP.,
Oct. 3, 1996, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS database. According to EU figures, imports
comprise 80% of the market in Belgium, 73% in Australia, 35% percent in the United States, and 25% in
Great Britain. Choy, supra note 189.
20 See, e.g., Choy, supra note 189.
201 See Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 1.4.
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panel to hear the dispute.2 °2 The Panel issued a final report on July 11,
1996.203
The Panel concluded that:
(i) Sh6chii and vodka are like products and Japan, by
taxing the latter in excess of the former, is in violation of its
obligation under Article 111:2, first sentence of the . . . [GATT
1994].204
(ii) Sh6chii, whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and
liqueurs are "directly competitive or substitutable products"
and Japan, by not taxing them similarly is in violation of its
obligation under Article 111:2, second sentence of the . . .
[GATT 1994].205
Based on its findings, the Panel recommended that the DSB request that
Japan bring the Liquor Tax Law into conformity with its obligations under
the GATT 1994.206
On August 8, 1996, Japan notified the DSB of its decision to appeal
certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.20 7 On
August 23, 1996, the United States filed an appellant's submission.208 All
of the parties filed Appellees' submissions soon after.20 9 An oral hearing
was held on September 9, 1996.21 o The Appellate Body made its decision
September 25, 1996.211
The Body found that the Panel had made errors in two areas.212 First
it had wrongly determined the status of previous panel reports.213 Second, it
improperly applied the Internal Taxation and Regulation provisions, Article
202 See id. paras. 1.5-1.7.
203 See Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §A.
204 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 7.1(i).
205 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 7.1 (ii).
206 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 7.2.
207 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §A.




212 See generally id While the Appellate Report conclusion refers to four errors, id., §I(a)-(d), they
can be grouped into two categories: (1) errors relating to the status of adopted panel reports, and (2) errors
relating to interpretation of Article III of GATT 1994. Id.
213 See id. §E.
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III of the GATT 1994.214 Yet despite the errors, the Appellate Body came to
the same conclusion as the Panel: 2Is sh6chii and the other alcoholic
beverages are "like products" or "directly competitive or substitutable";
216
Japan, by taxing these imported products in excess of sh6chfi, is in violation
of its obligations under the Internal Taxation and Regulation provisions,
Article III of the GATT 1994.217 In accordance with the DSU, the Body
recommended that the DSB request that Japan bring the Liquor Tax Law
into conformance with its obligations under the GATT 1994.218
B. Inadequate Interpretations of Law
Despite the decision's acceptance by the DSB on October 4, 1996,2"9
the Appellate Body does not sufficiently fulfill the duty of interpreting law.
Though the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention,220 the
history of the WTO, and paragraph 3.2 of the DSU 22' make clear the
importance of developing a predictable international trade law, this is not
furthered by the Appellate Body's interpretations.
It is important to note that defining what is an interpretation of law is
not self-evident nor clear from the Agreement.22 2 As a result, some issues in
the Japan Tax case, which might arguably be categorized as interpretation
of law, are not dealt with in this paper. In hopes of taking a conservative
position as to what is interpretation, this comment only considers those
issues involving unclear terminology and undeveloped tests.
The Japan Tax case raises two main interpretative issues: (1) what
are "like products," and (2) what are "directly competitive or substitutable
products., 223 As to both these issues, there are no established definitions,
nor have the parties to the Agreement intended special meanings for the
terms.
224





219 Overview of Disputes, supra note 8.
220 See Vienna Convention arts. 31-32.
221 DSU para. 3.2.
222 See QURESHI, supra note 23, at 99.
223 See generally Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2.
224 Vienna Convention art. 3 1, para. 4.
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1. Like Domestic Products
In interpreting what constitute "like domestic products," the
Appellate Body held that the term should be interpreted narrowly. 225  The
Body stated,
[blecause the second sentence of Article 111:2 provides for a
separate and distinctive consideration of the protective aspect
of a measure in examining its application to a broader category
of products that are not 'like products' 2 26 ... the first sentence
of Article III:2[, where the term 'like domestic products' is
usedI must be construed narrowly so as not to condemn
measures that its strict terms are not meant to condemn.227
In determining how narrowly the phrase should be interpreted, the Body
agreed with the inveterate practice228 that it should be determined on a case-
by-case basis.
229
The Body stressed that this analysis is not to be arbitrary. 230  Rather,
panels should make decisions using their best judgment considering such
criteria as the product's end-uses in a given market, consumers' tastes and
habits, and the product's properties, nature and quality.231  While tariff
bindings may be helpful in determining what are "like products, 232 as some
tariff bindings include a wide range of products,233 the Body held this was
25 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(lXa).
226 The statement refers to the broader category of "directly competitive or substitutable products".
See GATT 1994 art. 111:2, second sentence, amended by ad. art. 111:2.
227 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(l)(a).
228 Since the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, adopted in 1970, almost all
adopted panel reports have followed a case by case approach. Id (citing e.g EEC-Measures on Animal
Feed Proteins, Mar. 14, 1978, GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 49 (1978), Spain-Tariff Treatment of
Unroasted Coffee, June, 11, 198 1, GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 102 (1981), U.S. Gasoline Appellate.).
229 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(l)(a).
230 Id
231 Id (quoting Border Tax Adjustments, Dec., 2, 1970, GAIT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97, para.
18(1970)).
232 Id.
233 Many lesser developed nations, as well as other developing countries, have bindings in their
schedules which include broad ranges of products. Id. It is true that numerous tariff bindings are in fact
extremely precise with regard to product description and which, therefore, can provide significant guidance
as to the identification of"like products." Id.
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"not a reliable criterion for determining or confirming a product's
likeness." '234
In the end, despite some minor changes to the Panel's legal reasoning,
the Body affirmed the Panel's decision that vodka is a "like product" with
respect to sh6chi. 2 35 The Panel had made this decision as vodka and sh6chii
share most physical characteristics, 236 they both have the same tariff applied
to them in the Japanese tariff schedule, and Japan had provided no
convincing evidence that they were not like.237
The Body's decision is not illogical or innately poor. The Body
looked to the whole provision of Article III of the GATT 1994238 to
determine that "like domestic products" should be interpreted narrowly.
2 39
While previous practice does not carry any precedential value,240 it is
sensibly turned to as it "creates legitimate expectations. 24'
By providing a list of items to be considered,242 the Appellate Body
gestures in the direction of developing predictable and clear trade law. Yet
the emphasis on case-by-case analysis leaves the term excessively vague.
Providing predictability to WTO law could be better achieved with set
guidelines or particular tariff bindings.243 Though these actions could be
highly controversial,244 the Agreement does not provide that predictability
should be hindered because a specific decision would bring controversy.245
2. "Directly Competitive or Substitutable"
As with its definition of "like domestic product," the Body decided
that the category of "directly competitive or substitutable products" should
234 Id
235 Id.
236 The Panel agreed with a 1987 Panel Report which found that the products were "like" as they
are both white/clean spirits, made of similar raw materials, and the end-uses are virtually identical. See
Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 6.23.
237 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 6.23.
238 See Vienna Convention art. 31, paras. 1-2.
239 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(l)(a).
240 Id. §E.
241 Id.
242 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(l)(a).
243 But see id.
244 The Appellate Body seems overwhelmed with all the options of possible tariff bindings to apply
and the fact that some do not relate to product similarity. See id.
245 DSU para 3.2. "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system." Id.
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also be determined on a case-by-case basis. 24 6 In making determinations,
the Body recommended that such matters as physical characteristics,
common end-uses, tariff classifications, and the "marketplace" all be
considered.247 Particular stress is given to considering the "marketplace"
because "the GATT 1994 is a commercial agreement, and the WTO is
concerned, after all, with markets.,
24
1
In order to determine the situation in the marketplace, the Appellate
Body supported an examination of the elasticity of substitution in the
market.249 Yet, the Appellate Body also stressed that the elasticity is not
meant to be the decisive criterion.250 In fact, in response to an allegation by
the United States that the Panel considered it as the decisive criterion,251 the
Appellate Body clarified that this is not what the Panel stated. "The Panel
stated the following: '. . . the decisive criterion in order to determine
whether two products are directly competitive or substitutable is whether
they have common end-uses, inter alia, as shown by elasticity of
substitution.' 25 2  With this clarification of the Panel's statement, the
Appellate Body upheld the Panel's reasoning, 253 and found that all the other
products referred to by the complainants254 were "directly competitive or
substitutable." 255
The case-by-case rule set out for determining when a product is
"directly competitive or substitutable," while similar to the rule applied for
determining "like products, 256 is even more inappropriate here. For
determining "like products," the Body's case-by-case rule achieves some
predictability, as it stresses "narrowness '257 and turns to the historical






252 Id. §H(2)(a) (quoting Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 6.22).
253 Id.
254 For a list of the products at issue, see id n.56.
255 Despite the fact that the Appellate Body had found that the Panel had failed to address the full
range of alcoholic beverages included in the Panel's Terms of Reference, id., the Body concluded all the
products listed, except vodka which was determined a "like product," are "directly competitive or
substitutable." Id. §1. This is an odd conclusion considering that the DSU states the Appellate Body is to
determine questions of law. DSU para. 17.6. Here it seems the Appellate Body has decided an issue of
fact and, furthermore, has done so with no reference to the facts. See Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2,
§1.
256 See Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(l)(a).
257 Id.
JULY 1997
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
development of what constitutes a "like product., 258  In contrast, a case-by-
case rule applied to determine what products are "directly competitive or
substitutable" leaves Member nations and Panels bewildered as to how
broadly to apply the rule25 9 and with no historical understanding of how to
test the market at issue.
In fact, to make matters worse, while the Appellate Body stressed that
"elasticity of substitution" should not be the decisive criterion in
determining what is "directly competitive or substitutable, 2 60 the Panel,
despite a statement to the contrary, 26' did just that. The Panel made its
decision based on four factors: (1) the finding of the 1987 Panel Report;
2 62
(2) a study submitted by the complainants done by ASI market research, an
independent research institution ("the ASI study"); 263 (3) a survey submitted
by Japan; 264 and (4) evidence concerning the "1989 Japanese tax reform
which showed that whisky and sh6chil are essentially competing for the
same market., 26 ' Three of these four factors, factors two through four, were
explicitly held by the Panel to display significant elasticity of
substitution ! 
266
In addition, even the one study not given credence by the Panel was a
statistical analysis proving inelasticity of substitution. 267 This study done by
Shakai-Chosa Kenkyujo (Institute for Social Study) of Japan 268 was based
on household survey statistics from the past twenty years.2 69 The study was
259 See id.
259 The Body held that how much broader "directly competitive or substitutable" is from "like
product" is a matter for the panel in each case depending on the facts of the case. Id. §H(2)(a). In Japan
Tax, the present case, the Panel supported its conclusion that sh6chii is "directly competitive or
substitutable" with, among other studies, a survey showing that in the case of non-availability of sh6ch0i, a
mere 10 percent of consumers would switch to spirits or whisky. See Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, paras.
6.31-6.32.
2W Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(2)(a).
26 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 6.22; see also Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(2)(a).
262 See Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, at para. 6.32; see also id., para. 6.29, Japan Tax 1987, supra
note 190, para. 5.7.
263 See Japan Tax Panel. supra note 2, at paras. 6.32; see also id paras. 4.172-.174, 6.31.
264 See id. para. 6.32; see also id. para. 6.31.
265 See id. para. 6.32; see also id. paras. 4.82 - 4.93, 6.30.
266 The ASI study, factor (2), "contained persuasive evidence that there is significant elasticity of
substitution among the products in dispute." Id. pars. 6.32 (emphasis added). "The survey submitted by
Japan[, factor (3),] . . .shows elasticity of substitution among the products in dispute." Id. para. 6.32
(emphasis added). And finally, the fact that evidence shows that "foreign produced whisky and sh~ch0
were competing for the same market [after the 1989 Japanese tax reform, factor (4),] is evidence that there
was elasticity of substitution between them." Id. para. 6.30 (emphasis added).
267 Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 6.31.
269 Id. para. 4.85.
269 Id.
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allegedly done using the same statistical methods as the Bossard study, an
analysis commissioned by the European Commission to determine
competition between different categories of alcoholic drinks in the
European markets.270 Yet, the complaining parties discounted this study
stating that the methodology used, unlike in the Bossard study, was
flawed.2 7' The Panel discredited the study because Japan did not rebut the
criticism advanced against the studies.272
This dependence on studies of "elasticity of substitution," combined
with the Appellate Body's statement that the Panel didn't so depend, creates
confusion and not the predictability mandated by the DSU.
27 3
Moreover, the Panel's extensive consideration of elasticity should
have been taken as an omen by the Appellate Body. The Panel in Japan
Taxes is not likely to be the last to use "elasticity of substitution" studies in
application of Article 111:2 sentence two. 274 In fact, because the Appellate
Body discussed only one method for examining the market place, "elasticity
of substitution,, 275 and because this method of examination is also used by
national antitrust and trade law regimes to measure product competition,276
it is likely such a method of examination will be prevalent.
Yet despite "elasticity of substitution's" future of use, no clear
mandate as to how it should be determined is provided. The Appellate
Body, by stating that the Panel did not exclusively depend on "elasticity of
substitution," dodged a perfect opportunity to develop a methodology to
deal with the issue. As a result, evidentiary-type questions are left open.
For example:
1. Should studies, such as the ASI study, where data was taken
from "contemporary reactions of a representative sample of
sh6chfi drinkers to a series of thirty-six different combinations
of price levels for sh6chfi and five brown spirits" 27 7 carry more
270 Id.
271 See id. paras. 4.86-.89.
272 Id. para. 6.31.
273 DSU para. 3.2.
274 See GATT 1994 art. 111:2 second sentence, amended by ad art. 111:2.
275 Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §H(2)(a).
276 See Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, para. 6.3 1.
277 Id. para. 4.172. The brown spirits at issue were Scotch, Japanese whisky, cognac, Japanese
brandy, and North American Whisky. See id. para. 4.172.
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weight than historical studies such as that done by the Shakai-
Chosa Kenkyujo (Institute for Social Study) of Japan?
278
2. Or, are historical studies appropriate where, in contrast to
the Japan study,279 they consider a substantial amount of data28 °
and use well-recognized techniques for correcting statistical
problems?
281
3. Where statistical analyses are performed, should Panels turn
to outside experts to analyze the studies as provided for under
paragraph 13 of the DSU?
282
Though answers to these questions may be highly controversial, controversy
should not trump the pursuit of predictability.
In sum, the Body's interpretation leaves Members with no clear test
enabling them to determine if another party's allegations of discriminatory
taxation are valid. In determining if products are "directly competitive or
substitutable," each case will rest not on predictable guidelines, but rather
the Panel's case-by-case determinations.
VII. FUTURE INADEQUATE INTERPRETATIONS: A CALL FOR CHANGE
A. The Likelihood of Future Inadequate Interpretations
The Japan Tax case represents the Appellate Body's first
confrontation with interpretation issues. 283 Yet despite this, in light of the
importance of predictability and clarity in developing a credible dispute
279 Id. para. 4.83.
279 The European Union, the United States, and Canada all had qualms about Japan's study. The
Panel held the study to be essentially meaningless because Japan "had not succeeded in rebutting the
criticism advanced by the complainants..." Id. para. 6.31.
M8 See, e.g., id para. 4.169.
23 See, e.g., id. para. 4.86.
12 DSU para. 13.2. This provision states, in pertinent part, "Panels may seek information from any
relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With
respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a
panel may request an advisory report ... form an expert review group."
233 The other cases decided have not required extensive interpietation of unclear terminology or
undeveloped tests. See generally, U.S. Gasoline Appellate, supra note 8 .(finding that U.S. regulations to
control air pollution could not distinguish between domestic and foreign petroleum producers); U.S. Cotton
Underwear, id. (finding that backdating of a transitional safeguard measure is not permitted by the
provisions of the Agreement); Brazil Coconut, id. (discussing the integration of the different parts of the
agreement).
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settlement procedure,28 4 the Body's failure merits attention. Moreover,
considering the likelihood of future poor interpretations, this failure calls for
action.
The above discussion of "like domestic products" and "directly
competitive or substitutable products," clarifies that providing predictability
is a controversial task. Inevitably, wherever interpretation is necessary,
controversial issues will be confronted, and with over 130 Members of the
WTO, it isn't difficult to imagine that each Member will have a different
idea of how a particular term should be defined.28 5
In addition to the magnitude of controversy involved in defining
terms, the WTO's legal status threatens to hinder future predictability.
While domestic courts in many democratic nations are upheld as institutions
of public order and the ultimate arbiters of the legality of government
actions, this is not true for international tribunals. 2 6  With international
tribunals, cooperation and compliance is the choice of sovereign nations.
28 7
"If the local politics dujour or changing economics require or merit it, any
WTO member may exercise its sovereignty and take action inconsistent
with the WTO Agreement [or decisions by the DSB]. 288 While the DSU
allows for retaliation by the injured nations, in the past this has not proved
effective. 289 "Imposing trade sanctions generally is shooting yourself in the
foot: in a global economy, both consumers and industries that use the
sanctioned imports are adversely affected.,
29 °
One nation's non-compliance with a ruling may not bring ruin to the
WTO. Of course, the effect will depend on the nation. The United States'
frustration with the procedures under the GATT 1947 led to the heavy use
294 See Jackson, Reform Proposals, supra note 142, at 16; see text supra part V.B.
25 The four parties to the Japan Tax case all had different interpretations of the first sentence of
Article III which deals with the "like product" issue. See Japan Tax Panel, supra note 2, paras. 4.20-4.61.
286 Akakwam, supra note 57, at 295.
287 Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996).
288 Id
289 Bello & Holmer, supra note 30, at 1103. in 1952 in response to a complaint by the
Netherlands, the GATT contracting parties authorized the Netherlands to retaliate against the United States
for failure to bring dairy import practices into conformity with its GATT obligations. Id (discussing
United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products, Oct. 13, 1953, GATT B.I.S.D. (2nd Supp.) at 28
(1954).). This appears to have been the first and only time retaliation was authorized. Id at 1103.
Although the Netherlands was authorized to impose a limit of 60,000 tons on imported wheat flour from
the United States, it declined to exercise this authority because fears that such action would result in higher
prices for bread. Id
290 Id.
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of unilateral trade measures, 291 and eventually forced a dramatic change to
the dispute settlement procedure. 292  While the present system is more in
line with United States' expectations of dispute settlement,2?3 the United
States could still withdraw from the WTO,294  revert to unilateral
measures,295 or decide to not participate in a panel proceeding.296 These
actions could seriously hinder the organization and world trade.297
The Appellate Body's determinations of the propriety of a nation's
law already create controversy. 298 It is unlikely the Body will strive to also
deal with the highly political issues involved in defining terms or
developing methods of determining facts. Faced with interpreting vague
terms in ways which might threaten the stability of the WTO, the Appellate
Body is likely to strive to maintain the organization.299
This desire to maintain is visible in the Wheat Flour dispute brought
by the United States against the European Community in 1981.300 In this
case heard under the GATT 1947 procedures, a Panel was developed to
define "more than an equitable share.",30 1 "Faced with a politically charged
dispute over an ambiguous text. . . , the panel rejected the complaint and
ruled that the legal term at issue was too imprecise to be applied to world
wheat trade. 30 2 Had the Panel decided against the Community, "a severe
political crisis would have precipitated threatening the stability of
291 See Shell, supra note 49 at 843-45.
292 Id. at 846-48.
293 Montaild i Mora, supra note 33, at 129-31.
29 By statute the United States could withdraw in the year 2000. See 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (1996).
295 See Acting U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Address Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives (Sep. 11, 1996),
<http://www.ustr.gov/testimony/barshevsky_5.html>.
296 In reaction to the European Union's complaint against the Helms-Burton Act, senior U.S.
officials said the United States would not participate in a panel proceeding. U.S. Says WTO Panel Not
Competent to Judge Cuba Dispute, Hopes to Settle, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 9, at 351 (Feb. 26,
1997).
297 "[I]t would be a 'tremendous wrench' if the United States were to pull out." WTO Faces Major
Challenges in New Year, GATT Expert Says, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Dec. 12, 1994, available in 1994
WL 2097922 (quoting Professor John Jackson).
298 See Alan Tonelson & Lori Wallach, We Told You So; The WTO's First Trade Decision
Vindicates the Warnings of Critics, WASH. POST, May 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3077900;
Administration Bows to WTO Ruling / Critics Attack Plans to Change Rules on Imported Gasoline, HOUS.
CHRON., June 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5605294; Michiyo Nakamoto, WTO's Liquor Tax Ruling
Unsteadies Japan, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10618083.
299 See Shell, supra note 49, at 869.
30 See id. at 869-72.
301 Id.; see also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 147-51 (discussing
facts of Wheat Flour).
302 Shell, supra note 49, at 871.
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GATT.... ,,303 Deciding for the Community would have considerably
weakened the GATT.3°4
Though the Appellate Body's present understanding of its position
may keep it from rejecting complaints, 35  as the Japan Tax case
demonstrates, and the above discussion supports, avoidance of political
controversy is likely. This avoidance will hinder the development of
predictable WTO law and may, as occurred in the 1980s, result in disuse of
the procedure. In light of this predicament, the Members of the WTO
should reconsider Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement.
B. Implementing the Alternative
The understanding of Article IX:2 as de-coupling interpretation from
the Appellate Body 306 and leaving this for the Ministerial Conference or
General Council gives full weight to the words of the Article. Furthermore,
it will allow highly controversial issues to be heard by a political body
307
that truly represents every Member of the WTO. ° s In contrast to the
present situation where six individuals make interpretations of the
Agreement, 30 9 de-coupling would allow all 130 Members to be actively
involved in the decision making process.10
Though not every Member would be content with every
interpretation,31 this body is likely to provide a more predictable and
consistent body of law than the apprehensive Appellate Body. The clear
importance of furthering predictable international trade law is likely to
influence interpretations of the Members. In addition, the fear that WTO
decisions will be of poor quality,312 should result in a positive reception to
303 Id
304 Id. at 871-72 (citing I. Garcia Bercero, Trade Laws, GATT and the Management of Trade
Disputes Between the US and the EEC, 5 Y.B. EUR. L. 149, 168-70 (1985)).
305 See Japan Tax Appellate, supra note 2, §D.
306 QURESIH, supra note 23, at 99.
307 "[Tlhe General Council and the ministerial Conference are formally political bodies." Id. at 99.
3os See WTO Agreement art. IV.
309 See DSU paras. 8.5, 17.1.
310 See WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
311 The decision to adopt an interpretation takes a three-fourths majority of the Members. Id. art.
IX:2. Thus, potentially one-fourth of the Members will be unhappy with a decision.
312 U.S. President Clinton, appearing with [Senator] Dole at a White House news conference, said
that the agreement worked out between the administration and Dole, [allowing monitoring of WTO dispute
settlement decisions,] . . .means that the WTO will be 'accountable and fair and will meet our
expectations."' GA TT: Sen. Dole Pledges Support for GATT7 Bill After Winning Deal on WTO, Other
Issues, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.47, atl830 (Nov. 30, 1994).
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the opportunity to develop interpretations of the WTO Agreement. The
more clarity developed by these interpretations, the less freedom given to
the Dispute Settlement Body.
Implementing this de-coupling brings new problems. First, there is
the issue of "what constitutes an 'interpretative' decision."'3 13 No provisions
distinguish interpretation from application of law. Second, though Article
IX:2 provides that the Council overseeing the agreement in question
recommend action by the Ministerial Conference and General Council, 314 it
is not clear when such a recommendation should come. Third, there is a
danger that interpretation could result in "creeping legislation that could
undermine . . . the amendment provisions." '315 Finally, there is no clear
procedure to transfer interpretative issues from the DSB to the Ministerial
Conference or General Council.
Dealing with these problems will be a challenge; however, the
benefits of more predictable international trade law outweigh the costs.
Unpredictable rulings led to the demise of dispute resolution under the
GATT 1947;316 without more appropriate interpretations, this could occur
again. Therefore, WTO Members should begin development of an
"Interpretation of Agreements Procedure."
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, analysis of Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
displays significant inadequacies in the Appellate Body's interpretations of
law. Despite the fact that history and the dispute settlement procedures of
the WTO stress the importance of predictability in international trade law,
this is not provided by the Appellate Body's interpretations. As this
inadequacy is likely to continue, the Appellate Body should be restricted
from making interpretations. Instead, in compliance with Article IX:2 of
the WTO Agreement, interpretations should be made by the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council. Though developing a procedure to
transfer issues of interpretation from the DSB to these more political and
representative entities will be difficult, the benefits of predictable
international trade law outweigh the costs.
313 QURESHI, supra note 23, at 7.
314 WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
315 Id. at 8. The amendment provisions provide different voting requirements than Article IX:2.
Compare WTO Agreement art. X, with id. art. IX:2.
316 See, e.g., Akakwam, supra note 57, at 285.
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